In late June 2025, two vice-ministerial-level officials—Dai Daojin, former Deputy Party Secretary and Vice-Chairman of the Hunan Provincial CPPCC, and Liu Yuejin, former Counter-Terrorism Commissioner (vice-minister level) of the Ministry of Public Security—were each, respectively in Guangdong and Fujian, sentenced at first trial to death with a two-year reprieve. Both cases drew public attention not only for the enormous sums involved and the decades-long span of their corrupt conduct, but also because the accused held key positions in local governance and national security, making them emblematic cases in China’s sustained, high-pressure anti-corruption campaign.
I. The Dai Daojin Case: “Family-Style Corruption”
Dai Daojin, born February 1957 in Hanshou County, Hunan, is a prototypical “career local cadre.” His public résumé shows he joined the Chinese Communist Party in December 1975 and began work in December 1977; he holds a master’s degree in Business Administration from Hunan University (part-time postgraduate). Dai’s career began at the Hanshou County commune level and he long served in the Hunan Provincial Party Organization Department, becoming Office Director in 1996. From 2000 he held prominent local posts—Party Secretary of Zixing City; Deputy Mayor, Mayor, and Party Secretary of Chenzhou—before being appointed Director of the Provincial Government Office in 2011, promoted to Vice-Governor in 2014, and moving to the Hunan CPPCC as Deputy Party Secretary and Vice-Chairman from 2017 until his resignation in 2021.
In early 2024, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and National Supervisory Commission (NSC) announced an investigation of Dai. In July he was expelled from the Party; the disciplinary notice cited serious violations of political and organizational discipline, betrayal of the Party’s mission, “family-style corruption,” conduct power-for-money deals, and condone relatives for illicit gain, and even faking “digital performance metrics.” In November 2024 the case was transferred to the procuratorate, and in March 2025 the Zhuhai Intermediate People’s Court held its public trial.
On June 24, 2025, that court publicly pronounced its verdict: for taking bribes and abusing his influence to take bribes, Dai was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve, deprived of political rights for life, and ordered to forfeit all personal assets; for abusing his influence to take bribes, he received a four-year prison term plus a RMB 400,000 fine, with all sentences to run concurrently under the reprieve. The court found that from 2000 to 2024, Dai took bribes totaling RMB 107 million—directly or through relatives—and that from 2021 to 2023, after retirement, he continued to exploit residual influence to take an additional RMB 3.66 million in bribes.
“He engaged in nepotism, and condone relatives for illicit gain by power, illegally held shares in non-listed companies, resisted organizational investigations, orchestrated extensive power-for-money transactions, and even near the end of his tenure ‘fabricated digital political accomplishments.’ The court held that, although he showed remorse, pleaded guilty, and actively returned illicit gains, his subjective malice was deep and the harm to society grave; accordingly, it lawfully imposed a death sentence with a two-year reprieve.”[1]
II. The Liu Yuejin Case: The Fall of a “Counter-Terror Hero”
Liu Yuejin, born January 1959 in Guilin, Guangxi (ancestral home: Ningyuan, Hunan), represents the “sent-down youth” generation. After serving as a rural production-team leader in the 1970s, he entered Guangxi People’s Broadcasting Station as a reporter and editor by exam. In 1979 he enrolled in the inaugural Criminal Investigation program at Southwest University of Political Science and Law, becoming a prototypical “career-law-enforcement” officer. Upon graduation he was assigned to Tianjin Public Security Bureau, rising through posts as Youth League Secretary, Director of the Political Department, Criminal Investigation Chief, and Deputy Director of the Binhai suburban bureau. From 2001 he worked in the Ministry of Public Security: Executive Deputy Director of the General Office; Vice-President of the People’s Armed Police Command Academy; Director of the Narcotics Control Bureau; Deputy Director of the National Narcotics Control Commission; and in December 2015 he was appointed Counter-Terrorism Commissioner (vice-minister level), overseeing narcotics, counter-terrorism, food-drug-environment crimes, and wildlife law enforcement departments.
Liu led the “Operation 105” Mekong antidrug mission that captured kingpin Naw Kham, earning his team the 2012 “Touching China Special Tribute Award” and himself the “National Public Security System Second-Class Model Worker.”.
However, in March 2024 the CCDI and NSC announced his investigation for serious violations. In September he was expelled from the Party; disciplinary reports charged him with abusing public power for personal gain, unlawful retention of classified materials, and interfering in cases. In December 2024 the case was sent to the procuratorate, and in March 2025 the Fuzhou Intermediate People’s Court held the public trial.
On June 23, 2025, the court found Liu guilty of taking bribes totaling RMB 121 million between 1992 and 2020 by facilitating enterprise financing, project approvals, and personnel promotions. Despite his heroic credentials, the court sentenced him to death with a two-year reprieve, deprived him of political rights for life, and ordered the confiscation of all personal assets. The CCDI report noted Liu’s “He displayed a total disregard for Party discipline and the law, abusing his powers to carry out illegal acts.”” and his unauthorized retention of classified documents.[2]
III. What is a death sentence with a two-year reprieve? Why is it a death sentence with a two-year reprieve?
In the judicial process, for Party and government officials suspected of bribery, according to Article 385 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China and the judicial interpretations jointly promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate of China, if the amount of bribery is “particularly huge and has caused significant losses to the interests of the state and the people,” the death penalty may be imposed;[3] However, Articles 67 and 78 of the Criminal Law stipulate that for criminals who truthfully confess after being apprehended, voluntarily return the ill-gotten gains, or have made significant contributions, the death penalty with a two-year reprieve (referred to as “death with reprieve”) shall be applied. After the two-year reprieve period, the sentence may be commuted to life imprisonment (with an actual term of no less than 25 years of fixed-term imprisonment).[4]
For example, in the cases of Dai Daojin and Liu Yuejin, although each had accepted bribes exceeding 100 million yuan and the circumstances were severe, both truthfully confessed during the investigation and trial stages and returned most of the ill-gotten gains, leading the court to impose death with a two-year reprieve. In contrast, in the case of Zhang Zhongsheng, the former vice mayor of Lüliang City, Shanxi Province, who embezzled 1.04 billion yuan, extorted 88.68 million yuan, and continued to engage in corruption after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, causing particularly severe social repercussions and seriously impairing the healthy development of the local economy, and with over 300 million yuan of ill-gotten gains remaining unrecovered after the incident, the Intermediate People’s Court of Linfen sentenced him to death with immediate execution, deprived him of his political rights for life, and confiscated all his personal property.[5]
IV. Sustained High-Pressure Anti-Corruption and New Developments in the Discipline-Inspection and Supervision System
At the same time these two cases were filed, in 2024 national discipline-inspection and supervisory agencies initiated 642,000 cases, of which 58 involved provincial-ministerial-level cadres; they investigated nearly 600,000 incidents of petty corruption affecting the public; and in the first eleven months alone they addressed nearly 92,000 instances of formalism and bureaucratism.[6]
According to Southern Metropolis Daily, in the first half of 2025, 32 cadres under the management of the CPC Central Committee were removed from their positions—the highest mid-year total on record. Nineteen of them were still in office at the time of investigation, accounting for nearly 60 percent. These officials spanned local governments, central ministries, state-owned enterprises, and the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference systems. Among the five removed who held full ministerial rank were Shanxi Governor Jin Xiangjun, Guangxi Chairman Lan Tianli, and former Tibet Chairman Qizhala.[7]
Looking back over the origins of China’s discipline-inspection and supervision system, it actually comprises two strands: the Party’s internal discipline-inspection apparatus and the state supervision system. The earliest ancestor was the “Central Supervisory Committee” established by the Fifth Party Congress in 1927, drawing on both Soviet practice and traditional Chinese “supervision” culture. During subsequent revolutionary, state-building, and reform periods the Party’s discipline bodies evolved through multiple iterations such as “Examination Committee,” “Party Affairs Committee,” “Discipline Inspection Committee,” and “People’s Supervisory Committee,” among others. In 1993, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection merged offices with the Ministry of Supervision for the first time, coining the term “discipline inspection and supervision.” After the 18th Party Congress, supervision reform further consolidated anti-corruption responsibilities into the National Supervisory Commission, making the merged structure a hallmark of China’s distinctive oversight system.[8]
Historically, “Shuanggui” (also called “Two Regulations”) allowed Party disciplinary commissions to confine suspected cadres at unspecified times and places, without judicial process. Lacking time limits, interrogation safeguards, or lawyer access, “Shuanggui” led to frequent fatigue interrogations, prolonged detention, and even deaths. To correct these abuses, the 19th Party Congress report proposed replacing “Two Regulations” with “liuzhi” (supervisory detention), which the 2018 Supervision Law formally adopted. Consequently, detention is permitted only in designated facilities, for no more than six months; written records required; notification of family and employer within 24 hours; and interrogation schedules to be “reasonably arranged.” Although details like overnight rest and full lawyer participation remain to be clarified, this step embeds Party discipline measures within a national legal framework, marking a crucial advance toward rule-based, proceduralized internal oversight.[9]
Following the 2018 reform, the CCDI and Supervisory Commission merged their functions in a single office, and the Supervision Law streamlined the investigation process into six stages—clue intake, preliminary verification, case filing, formal investigation, transfer to trial, and prosecution—achieving real “all-public-servants coverage.” Under General Secretary Xi Jinping’s “curing root causes” directive, discipline-inspection and supervision bodies are evolving from case-focused work toward systemic improvement and long-term governance, continually strengthening the institutional restraints on power and enhancing operational transparency.
It is important to remark that after the “transfer for trial and prosecution” phase, the Dai and Liu cases were not heard by the Supreme People’s Court nor by the intermediate/high court in their home provinces. Instead, they were tried by the Zhuhai and Fuzhou Intermediate People’s Courts, respectively. Cross-regional trials have become routine for high-level corruption cases: lower-level officials may be tried in another city within the province, while provincial- and minister-level officials are transferred to other jurisdictions. Professor Hong Daode of China University of Political Science and Law observes that although cross-regional trials are not legally mandated, appointing a designated court effectively prevents local networks from influencing investigations and rulings, safeguarding judicial independence and impartiality[10].
Conclusion
The sentencing of Dai Daojin and Liu Yuejin is the mid-year hallmark of China’s anti-corruption campaign in 2025. As China’s discipline-inspection and supervision system continues to institutionalize, legalize, and standardize, the intensity of corruption-fighting only grows. Maintaining a “zero-tolerance” stance, China’s evolving framework offers important lessons for global anti-corruption theory and practice.
[1] Zhai, Ruimin. “Hunan CPPCC Vice-Chairman Dai Daojin Sentenced to Death with Reprieve for Over RMB 100 Million in Bribes over 24 Years.” Jiemian News, June 24, 2025. https://www.jiemian.com/article/12947597.html
[2] Yu, Hui (Editor). “Death with Reprieve: Liu Yuejin, Former Narcotics Bureau Director and Ministry-Level Counter-Terrorism Commissioner, Took Over RMB 120 Million.” Beijing Youth Daily – Zheng Zhijian Official Account via QQ News, June 23, 2025. https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20250623A06U4L00
[3] Supreme People’s Court & Supreme People’s Procuratorate. “Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Embezzlement and Bribery.” Announcement, April 19, 2016. https://www.spp.gov.cn/zdgz/201604/t20160419_116381.shtml
[4] National People’s Congress. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China. Promulgated August 21, 1997; last amended 2021. http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/npc/lfzt/rlys/2008-08/21/content_1882895.htm
[5] Zhao, Bingzhi. “Analysis of the First Corruption Case Sentenced to Immediate Execution of the Death Penalty since the 18th Party Congress.” China Criminal Law Research Association, March 29, 2018. https://www.chinalaw.org.cn/portal/article/index/id/16445/cid/72.html
[6] Xinhua. “2024 China Clean-Governance and Anti-Corruption ‘Report Card.’” Central Commission for Discipline Inspection & National Supervisory Commission Website, December 25, 2024.
[7] 2025 Mid-Year Anti-Corruption Report: 32 ‘Tigers’ Brought Down, All Five Minister-Rank Officials in Office When Removed.” 21st Century Business Herald via Sina Finance, July 1, 2025.
[8] Wang, Xipeng. “Integrity Literature: Origins, Evolution, and Insights of ‘Discipline Inspection and Supervision.’” China Discipline Inspection & Supervision Studies, Guangzhou University Center for Clean Governance, April 8, 2025.
[9] Zhou, Wei, and Li, Zheng. “China Legalizes ‘Liuzhi’ and Replaces ‘Shuanggui’ in Anti-Corruption Cases.” BBC Chinese, March 19, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-43451802
[10] Bai, Shikang. “From Report to Trial: Tracing the Investigation Process of Corruption Cases.” Communist Party Member Network, April 15, 2015.
